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Addressing Historical Wrongs in Post-Transition South Africa: 





The concept of transformative justice has emerged in recent years as a response to perceived 
shortcomings in the standard toolkit of transitional justice, particularly in relation to 
addressing structural violence and violations of socioeconomic rights.1 This chapter asks 
what role the concept of transformative justice might have in addressing the continuing 
effects of historical wrongs on South Africa in the post-transition period. There are three 
areas where the concept may add value to analysis and practice. These are, first, as a means 
by which measures seeking to address historical wrongs may be analysed and evaluated. 
Second, as an explicit framework for action shaping policymaking and practice. Third, as a 
means by which practices and policies may be understood in relationship to one another and 
in relation to addressing historically rooted structural violence and socioeconomic rights 
issues (Evans, 2013b). Here each of these possible uses is explored and evaluated with 
reference to the South African context. Risks and difficulties associated with adopting the 
transformative justice framework in one way or another are also discussed. The chapter 
concludes that transformative justice can most readily add value to the analysis of existing 
                                                          
1 See, for example, Gready et al., 2010; Gready and Robins, 2014; Evans, 2013a; Evans, 2016. 
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and proposed actions (policy and practice) in relation to their contribution to addressing 
socioeconomic rights violations and other historical wrongs. It is also concluded that the 
transformative justice framework could play a role in implicitly or explicitly shaping practice. 
However, it is suggested that there are more significant obstacles to this than there are to the 
adoption of transformative justice as an analytical lens. 
 
This chapter is not in large part concerned with defining transformative justice. This has been 
attempted by scholars elsewhere (including in this volume), with some key areas of overlap 
between most definitions (see, for example, Gready et al., 2010; Lambourne, 2009; 
Lambourne, 2011; Daly, 2002). It is worthwhile, however, briefly outlining what is and is not 
considered to be transformative justice for the purposes of this chapter. Here transformative 
justice is taken to be separate to transitional justice and to general ideas of social justice. Like 
transitional justice, transformative justice is concerned with addressing historical wrongs in 
post-conflict and post-authoritarian contexts. However, unlike transitional justice, 
transformative justice takes a particular focus on socioeconomic rights issues, structural 
violence and longer-term change, and upon the participation of affected communities, rather 
than a concentration on elite bargains (Daly, 2002; Gready et al., 2010; Gready and Robins, 
2014).2 Paul Gready and Simon Robins sum up the definition of transformative justice as 
‘transformative change that emphasizes local agency and resources, the prioritization of 
                                                          
2 Paul Farmer, for instance, argues that ‘Structural violence is violence exerted systematically – that is, 
indirectly – by everyone who belongs to a certain social order… In short, the concept of structural violence is 
intended to inform the study of the social machinery of oppression’ (Farmer, 2004: 307). See also Galtung 
(1969), Gupta (2013) and Farmer (1996) for further elaboration of the commonalities and distinction between 
structural violence and direct, interpersonal violence. On the question of who might qualify as elites, see 
McAuliffe (this volume). 
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process rather than preconceived outcomes and the challenging of unequal and intersecting 
power relationships and structures of exclusion at both the local and the global level’ (Gready 
and Robins, 2014: 340). This means that in a context, such as South Africa, which could be 
termed ‘post-transition’ in that transitional justice mechanisms, such as truth commissions, 
trials, amnesties and reparations programmes, have largely run their course (successfully or 
otherwise), transformative justice remains a live concern (see, for example, Gready et al., 
2010; Collins, 2010; Waldorf, 2012). Furthermore, this necessitates concern with processes 
other than the legal and quasi-legal instruments transitional justice (and ‘post-transitional 
justice’) typically focuses on (Evans, 2016). Bearing this definition in mind, the analytical 
utility of the transformative justice framework is discussed next, followed by exploration of 
its potential role in practice and a discussion of associated risks and difficulties. 
 
Applying transformative justice to analysis 
There are several possible analytical roles for the concept of transformative justice. 
Transformative justice brings together a number of ideas which might otherwise be treated as 
separate. In particular, transformative justice provides a framework by which (at least some) 
contemporary struggles for social change in post-transition contexts such as South Africa 
may be understood in a wider context and as connected to historical wrongs (such as 
apartheid, conflict and societal division) (Evans, 2013b; Evans, 2016; see also Harris et al., 
2014).3 In this sense it is possible to evaluate and distinguish social justice and development 
                                                          
3 Some of the same principles can also be applied to measures seeking to address the effects of historical wrongs 




issues according to whether they are also transformative justice issues. This affects how 
contemporary conditions and struggles are understood and responded to from an intellectual 
and practical point of view. For instance, the profound inequalities in access to land and 
housing in South Africa are in large part the result of the ongoing influence of apartheid (see, 
for example, Gibson, 2011). Neither the advent of democracy, nor transitional justice 
mechanisms such as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission directly addressed these. 
Activism and advocacy around these issues has, however, continued. 
 
With regard to housing, post-apartheid policy has been criticised for failing to provide 
enough, or adequate, housing (see, for example, Govender, Barnes and Pieper, 2011: 335-
342; Goebel, 2007: 291-293; Bond and Tait, 1997). Post-apartheid housing policy has 
followed a market-oriented approach for the most part (Bond and Tait, 1997: 19-20), based 
on ‘the idea of providing subsidies to poor families to allow them to buy homes produced by 
the private sector’ (Gilbert, 2004: 17). This approach has been supported by the World Bank 
and other international development institutions and was pioneered in Chile from the late 
1970s (Gilbert, 2004: 14). In South Africa the housing subsidy scheme is available to assist 
‘virtually every family earning less than 3,500 rand’ (Gilbert, 2004: 27). However, the size, 
quality and location (on urban peripheries) of subsidised housing have been criticised.4 
Health and environmental concerns have also been raised as well as criticisms of the 
bureaucracy and administrative processes associated with accessing the housing subsidy 
                                                          
4 There is some support for government claims to have made significant progress (especially with regard to the 
number of houses built). Allison Goebel, for instance, notes that, despite criticism of the policy, ‘the low-cost 
housing and service delivery programs have dramatically increased access to urban services by the poor’ and 
that the UN has recognised South Africa’s achievements in housing provision (Goebel, 2007: 291-293; see also, 
Gilbert, 2004: 18-19). 
5 
 
(Goebel, 2007: 291-296; Gilbert, 2004: 28-32). Indeed, ‘[t]o get onto a housing list may still 
require becoming a client of a local warlord or neo-traditional powerbroker’ (Robins, 2008: 
167). 
 
It has been suggested that in attempting to address ‘an estimated annual increase in the 
‘housing deficit of 200,000 families’ the ANC government’s housing subsidy delivery 
‘effectively chose quantity over quality’ (Gilbert, 2004: 24). The government’s arguable 
achievements in terms of the quantity of housing provision and the shortcomings in relation 
to housing quality are in part shaped by the government’s approach to land reform. The 
current approach to land reform is largely market oriented and focuses more on restitution 
than on wider redistribution. Consequently, the overarching structures shaping unequal land 
access, distribution and ownership are largely unchanged (see Evans, 2016). In order to 
provide housing on well-located land it would be necessary to challenge the existing 
approach to land reform. The pressures to maintain this approach and the barriers to faster or 
wider reaching redistribution of land do not hinder house building on urban peripheries as 
much as on well-located land. It may be easier to provide a large number of houses in these 
locations. However, this can reinforce existing ghettoisation and result in houses being built 
without sufficient access to services, infrastructure and economic opportunities (Bond and 
Tait, 1997: 27; Goebel, 2007: 292).5 The provision of housing away from well-located land is 
in turn a factor contributing to the large number of recipients of housing subsidies who 
subsequently rent out or sell their houses (frequently at low prices), often in favour of living 
in informal settlements closer to economic opportunities (Goebel, 2007: 292; Robins, 2008: 
92). Steven Robins further points out that many subsidy recipients also move back to 
                                                          
5 See also, personal interview with Luthando Ndabambi, Cape Town, 12 August 2010. 
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informal settlements ‘because the houses are too small and they cannot afford to extend using 
formal building materials, and/or they cannot afford to pay rates and service fees’ (Robins, 
2008: 92). The housing subsidy programme provides subsidy recipients ‘with a physical 
structure but not the means to survive under conditions of extreme poverty’ (Robins, 2008: 
92). 
 
Moreover, given the scale of the housing deficit – even as compared to the large number of 
subsidised houses built – the quantity and rate of delivery of housing provided through the 
subsidy scheme has also been criticised as insufficient (Bond and Tait, 1997: 27; Robins, 
2008: 167).6 In Cape Town, for instance, over a decade into democracy, there was ‘still a 
shortage of 250,000 houses’ (Robins, 2008: 167; on other parts of South Africa, see also 
Community Law Centre and Socio-Economic Rights Institute, 2013). This housing deficit, 
ghettoisation, and their effects, can be seen as a direct legacy of apartheid policies as 
implementation of Coloured Labour Preference Area and homelands policies have led to an 
ongoing ‘massive shortage of housing for black Africans’ in Cape Town (Robins, 2008: 167), 
as well as parallel problems in other parts of South Africa (see, for example, Community Law 
Centre and Socio-Economic Rights Institute, 2013). The overarching conditions of injustice 
surrounding realisation of the right to housing remain untransformed (Huchzermeyer, 2003; 
Bond and Tait, 1997). 
 
Considering socioeconomic rights issues such as this in terms of the structural violence 
inflicted by apartheid allows questions to be raised with regard to the justness of the post-
apartheid settlement and the justness or otherwise of policies aimed at addressing these issues 
                                                          
6 See also, personal interview with Martin Legassick, Cape Town, 4 August 2010. 
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(see Evans, 2013b: 101-102; Evans, 2016). For instance, in the case of land and housing 
rights in post-apartheid South Africa it may be concluded that the market-oriented policies 
put in place to address inequalities rooted in apartheid do not adequately challenge the 
apartheid-defined status quo. This leads to the further conclusion that some civil society 
actors promote transformative justice – that is to say, contribute to addressing ongoing effects 
of apartheid – more than others (Evans, 2013b: 191-192; see also Evans, 2018a). Those 
which challenge or contest the established, untransformative paradigm contribute towards 
transformative justice to a greater extent than those actors which accept or work wholly 
within the established paradigm (see Evans, 2018a).  
 
 
Furthermore, this conception and application of transformative justice facilitates analysis 
which transcends the implied dichotomy of pre- and post-transition eras. Whilst perhaps not 
inevitable, the pinning down of the completion of transition to a date (in South Africa, in 
1994 with the first democratic elections, or 1996 when the new constitution was finalised, for 
instance) can lead to neglect of the importance of pre-transition conditions to contemporary 
circumstances. From a transformative justice point of view these dates can be seen as largely 
artificial. It is the case that formal apartheid has come to an end and that transitional justice 
mechanisms have largely run their course. However, these mechanisms did not address all of 
the injustices of apartheid. Indeed, there is good reason for thinking that transitional justice 
mechanisms are not intended to, are not well suited to, and perhaps should not attempt to 
address structural violence or socioeconomic rights issues (Mani, 2008; Waldorf, 2012). 
Whilst the case has been made for addressing some socioeconomic rights issues through 
expanding the established focus of transitional justice mechanisms (for example, Mani, 2008; 
Pasipanodya, 2008; Skaar, 2011; Sankey, 2014; Schmid and Nolan, 2014), these mechanisms 
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cannot do everything. The expansion of transitional justice to attempt to address 
socioeconomic rights issues has been criticised, particularly in light of shortcomings in 
successfully carrying out its established narrower mandate (see Waldorf, 2012). 
 
Indeed, a 2014 editorial in the International Journal of Transitional Justice, for instance, 
noted that ‘the implementation of every significant transitional justice initiative has fallen 
short in meeting the expectations of victims and their advocates’ (International Journal of 
Transitional Justice, 2014: 1). Analysis from a transformative justice perspective refocuses 
attention upon the areas which have not been (or cannot be) addressed by transitional justice 
mechanisms. Moreover, it is also necessary, from this point of view, to look beyond the 
transitional lens of these mechanisms and of the notion of transitional justice. In doing so 
further clarity may be provided on what concrete forms transformative justice might take as 
distinct from the established concrete institutional forms of transitional justice.7 
 
The refocusing of analytical attention on to areas which are neglected by transitional justice 
(whether by accident or design) and on to the links between contemporary development and 
social justice issues and historical wrongs can also lead to increased analytical attention to the 
needs and the participation of affected communities (see, for example, Robins, 2011; Robins, 
2013a). Frequently, socioeconomic rights issues and structural violence have a wider impact 
than that of violations of civil and political rights and direct personal violence (Waldorf, 
2012: 175). In post-transition South Africa much of the population continues to be affected 
by structural violence rooted in the pre-transition period (such as poverty, economic and 
                                                          
7 See, for example, the rest of this book, particularly McGill, this volume; Lai and Bonora, this volume; 
Bollaert, this volume. 
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social inequalities, and the effects of a highly racialised class system), including many who 
did not experience (or are too young to have experienced) direct violence by the apartheid 
regime (see, for example, Robins, 2008; Gibson, 2011). Socioeconomic rights are also often 
prioritised by those who (civil and political rights-oriented) transitional justice mechanisms 
are intended to benefit (Waldorf, 2015: 175; Robins, 2011; Robins, 2013a). The recognition 
of this and the intellectual attention this entails in terms of understanding and validating the 
concerns and experiences of those affected by structural violence is an important role for 
transformative justice analysis. The need for a different response in policy and practice to that 
of typical transitional justice mechanisms is implied. This goes some way towards defining a 
distinct area in which transformative justice analysis contributes intellectually, illuminating 
areas of concern to those affected by conflict and authoritarianism (and potential responses to 
these) which might be obscured or de-emphasised in alternative analyses. 
 
With regard to the possible value added by transformative justice analysis to discussions 
around post-transition South Africa it is worthwhile considering the particular influence 
transformative justice analysis may have upon understanding the role of civil society. A 
broad definition of civil society is used here, including, for instance, both contentious and 
non-contentious action taken by informal social movements and more formal organisations 
such as trade unions and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs).8 Civil society action is, of 
course, a broad field. It is possible, however, to apply a transformative justice analytical lens 
to those elements of civil society which engage in political and social action around human 
rights issues and socioeconomic grievances. Not all of these are of clear relevance to 
                                                          
8 For more detailed interrogation (and problemetising) of civil society as a concept, see inter alia Robins, 2008: 
7; Sen, 2010. 
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transformative justice, though an analysis from this point of view allows for action to be 
assessed with regard to whether it contributes to the addressing of historical wrongs (such as 
apartheid – and colonial – land dispossession) (see, for example, Harris et al., 2014). This has 
two aspects. One is to assess whether a given area of civil society action is concerned with a 
transformative justice issue. The other is to assess whether (or to what extent) the action 
taken contributes towards promoting transformative justice and why or why not. 
 
At least some of the social movements and wider civil society mobilisation which came to 
prominence from the end of the first post-apartheid government can meaningfully be 
considered in terms of transformative justice (see Ballard et al., 2005). In at least some cases, 
civil society opposition to the post-apartheid government is not simply a question of 
ideological differences or of criticism of promises left unfulfilled. There is a deeper question 
about why it is important for certain political issues to be addressed, why civil society actors 
are concerned with them and what kinds of responses might resolve those issues. As already 
noted, with regards to activism around land and housing rights, for instance, it may be argued 
that current inequalities in access to land and housing continue to be shaped by apartheid. It is 
then possible to evaluate responses to these (see, for example, Evans, 2013b: 171-185). 
 
As argued elsewhere (see Evans, 2013b; Evans, 2018a), actors such as the social movements 
which participate in the Poor People’s Alliance and the (to some degree overlapping) groups 
which participate in the Housing Assembly display a higher degree of transformative 
potential in their responses to land and housing inequalities than those actors closely 
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associated with Shack/Slum Dwellers International (SDI).9 SDI’s orientation towards 
working with government as a priority which takes precedence over grassroots militancy can 
act as a limiting factor in terms of transformative justice (see Evans, 2018a; also Podlashuc, 
2011).10 Engagement in more contentious tactics and overt criticism of the state does not 
necessarily produce more transformative results (though it can). However, it is the case that 
the provision of a platform for the participation of affected communities in shaping priorities 
and approaches (potentially including contentious tactics) – contributes to transformative 
processes (see Evans, 2013b; Evans, 2018a). There are also challenges and limitations in the 
approaches taken by Poor People’s Alliance linked social movements such as the Western 
Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign and the shack dwellers’ movement Abahlali baseMjondolo, 
and by the Housing Assembly (which links together community based and social movement 
organisations in Cape Town with an NGO – the International Labour Research and 
Information Group – and the local structures of the South African Municipal Workers’ 
Union).11 It is, nevertheless, the case that these actors are not constrained to working within 
the largely untransformative paradigm of the status quo in the same way as SDI (which 
                                                          
9 See also Poor People’s Alliance (n.d.), as well as personal interview with Mncedisi Twalo, Cape Town, 4 July 
2012; personal interview with Lorraine Heunis and Eleanor Hoedemaker, Cape Town, 7 August 2012; personal 
interview with Michael Blake, Cape Town, 6 July 2012; personal interview with Michael Blake, Johannesburg, 
10 April 2015. 
10 See, also personal interview with Sandra van Rensburg, Johannesburg, 13 March 2015. 
11 See, for example, Pointer (2004); Mdlalose (2014); also personal interview with Soraya Hendricks, Cape 
Town, 11 July 2012; personal interview with Michael Blake, Johannesburg, 10 April 2015. Evans (2018a) 
explores this in greater detail. 
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concentrates on a particular methodology and set of priorities).12 Furthermore, these actors 
put forward analysis which is overtly critical of the same structural conditions with which 
transformative justice is concerned and offer greater potential for politically responsible 
participation of diverse actors than SDI does (such as through the relationships between the 
grassroots community based elements of the Housing Assembly and the professionalised 
NGO and trade union elements).13 
 
Transformative justice on the ground 
In practice there are two broad areas in which the concept of transformative justice may play 
a role: in overtly shaping how policy and practice is framed or by implicitly shaping practice 
regardless of its explicit framing. This section of the chapter first discusses the latter 
possibility then moves on to a discussion of the former. 
 
Regarding the question of whether practice or policies contribute to transformative justice it 
does not necessarily matter whether these are couched in the terminology of transformative 
justice. What matters more is the substance of the idea of transformative justice. In this sense 
a role for transformative justice in practice can be discerned. This links to the application of 
transformative justice as an analytical framework. It is possible to link contemporary 
struggles for the realisation of socioeconomic rights to the addressing of structural violence 
rooted in historic injustices. Indeed, these links are reflected in the practice of some actors 
                                                          
12 See Podlashuc, 2011 and personal interview with Sandra van Rensburg, Johannesburg, 13 March 2015. 




(such as those linked to the Poor People’s Alliance and Housing Assembly) and there can be 
value added by this. Rhetorically, and in terms of the response invited by duty-bearers, this is 
important. For instance, the understanding that landlessness and housing inequalities in 
contemporary South Africa are symptomatic of the ongoing effects of apartheid suggests 
certain approaches to advocacy and policymaking and precludes – or at least questions – 
others (see Evans, 2018a). For example, the current policy paradigm regarding land reform 
(particularly redistribution), and its effects on the realisation of the right to housing (amongst 
other rights), may be challenged on the grounds that it is insufficiently transformative of 
apartheid conditions and is therefore insufficiently just (see, for example, Evans, 2016). For 
instance, market-oriented ‘willing buyer, willing seller’ processes have been very slow in 
facilitating redistribution of land and can be said to have failed to transform historically 
unjust conditions.14 Actors which work from this understanding can be said to be more likely 
to contribute to transformative justice in practice (see Evans, 2013b: 185, 189-193). 
Furthermore, acceptance of (or at least engagement with) this approach by key duty-bearers 
(such as the state) creates an opening for transformative justice-oriented policies to be 
pursued. 
 
In addition to this, actors which facilitate the participation of those affected by structural 
violence contribute in this way to the practice of transformative justice. This is necessary to 
avoid the pitfalls of elite-oriented transitional justice (Daly, 2002; Waldorf, 2012). Moreover, 
participation can be beneficial both in terms of placing the concerns of affected communities 
on broader political agendas and by empowering individuals and communities through the 
process of participation (Tissington, 2012; Robins, 2013a; Gaventa and Barrett, 2010). 
                                                          
14 See, for example, James, 2007; Greenberg, 2004; Walker, 2008; de Satgé, 2013. 
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Regardless of how action challenging an untransformative policy paradigm is overtly 
described it contributes to the same idea as transformative justice. As mentioned above, at 
least some civil society actors in South Africa take this approach.15 Furthermore, actors 
taking this kind of approach have had some success in eliciting political and legal outcomes 
and in facilitating positive processes.16 Consequently, there is a case to be made that the idea 
of transformative justice (as it is called here) can play a role in implicitly shaping practice. 
 
With regard to the role of transformative justice in explicitly shaping policy and practice 
more speculation is necessary. In South Africa there are not (as yet at least) civil society 
actors overtly framing their practice in terms of transformative justice, likewise government 
policies have not been explicitly put forward in these terms. This does not, however, preclude 
the possibility of practice being overtly framed in terms of transformative justice. There could 
be benefits to the adoption of such a framing. Policies or practices which explicitly adopt 
transformative justice framing can more easily be evaluated according to the aims and 
expectations of transformative justice. In practice this could be useful for holding states or 
other actors to account regarding their rhetorical commitments.17 
 
                                                          
15 See Evans (2013b) and Evans (2018a) for discussion of social movement organisations, NGOs and trade 
unions in a South African land and housing rights activist network in this regard. 
16 See, for example, Tissington (2012); McKinley (2012). 
17 See Uvin, (2004: 167-201) for a discussion of how rhetorical (and deeper) commitments to human rights 
framing can be used to hold development actors to account. See also Keck and Sikkink, (1998: 16-25) for a 




In South Africa the language of ‘transformation’ has some political currency (see, for 
example, South African Press Association, 2014; Congress of South African Trade Unions, 
2013). Transformation has been defined in a variety of ways. For instance, Thiven Reddy 
argues that there is a ‘minimal consensus’ over considering transformation as addressing ‘the 
material “backlog”, the material and psychological poverty suffered by the majority of 
citizens which disadvantages them in exercising the rights enshrined in the new constitution 
and accessing the resources available in society’ (Reddy, 2004: 39). Others put forward 
understandings of transformation which focus upon poverty, economic inequality and 
patterns of discrimination relating to race, gender and sexuality, for instance (see, for 
example, Albertyn, 2007; Liebenberg and Goldblatt, 2007; Gumede, 2012). Much discussion 
of transformation has considered the extent to which the South African constitution, 
particularly its socioeconomic rights provisions, is – or can be interpreted to be – 
transformative (see, for example, Albertyn, 2007; Liebenberg and Goldblatt, 2007; De Vos, 
2010). Recent mobilisations around universities, however, have drawn attention to 
transformation (and the at times overlapping concept of decolonisation) as applied to access 
to education, curricula content and demographic makeup of staff and student bodies amongst 
a number of other issues (see, for example, Qukula, 2015; Subramany, 2015; Ntuli, 2015). 
 
At times the notion of transformation suffers from a lack of clarity (see, for example, De Vos, 
2010). Nevertheless, there is potential for the practice of transformative justice to be linked to 
or integrated with existing notions of transformation.18  Indeed, there might be value added to 
the discourse around transformation through the adoption of transformative justice as an 
                                                          
18 Some commentators have, for instance, linked recent mobilisation of student activism to the addressing of 
structural violence (see, for example, Godsell, 2015). 
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approach to transformation. If the purpose and scope of transformative justice is clearly 
defined this could contribute to clarifying what transformation could or should be and what 
policies and practices contribute towards its realisation. 
 
Particularly given the opening presented by the political currency of transformation in South 
Africa, it is not inconceivable that the framework or transformative justice could be adopted 
by, for instance, actors within or seeking to influence the government. Though, as discussed 
in the next section, there are some difficulties attached to this. 
 
Risks and difficulties 
So far this chapter has largely discussed the possible value added by a transformative justice 
approach. Here some of the risks and difficulties attached to adopting such an approach are 
explored. Firstly, there is the risk of vagueness or imprecision. The second difficulty is in 
relation to the overt adoption of transformative justice by practitioners as a framework for 
action and/or policymaking. 
 
The risk of vagueness can affect both analytical and practical application of transformative 
justice. In essence this is the danger that transformative justice becomes an indistinct idea, 
that it fails to clarify anything intellectually or that it fails to offer any practical insights. This 
is a real danger, not helped by the current lack of a large unified or coherent literature 
theorising and defining transformative justice.19 The following questions are invited: if 
transformative justice is simply doing transitional justice better why not call it that? If 
                                                          
19 On this see, for example, McAuliffe, 2017. See also Evans, 2018a. 
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transformative justice is synonymous with social justice what purpose does the term serve? 
This chapter argues that for the term to retain meaning it is essential transformative justice is 
defined and applied as distinct from transitional justice and social justice, even if a degree of 
overlap is necessary (Evans, 2013b, 95-102; Evans, 2016; Skaar, 2011, Gready et al., 2010). 
Otherwise transformative justice may on the one hand become a superfluous buzzword or 
may on the other hand confuse matters through being applied inconsistently to multiple 
(unrelated) phenomena.20 The idea of reconciliation, for instance, frequently suffers from 
this. If the dangers observable in the deployment of reconciliation as an ‘empty universal’ are 
to be avoided in efforts to pursue transformative justice then it is necessary to consider and 
clarify what transformative justice is in practice and how this relates – or departs from – 
existing notions and practices, such as those associated with transitional justice (see, for 
example, Renner, 2014; see also Evans, 2018b). 
 
Consideration of the arguments recently made by Evelyne Schmid and Aoife Nolan, with 
regard to the extent to which transitional justice can address socioeconomic rights, may also 
be useful here (Schmid and Nolan, 2014). Schmid and Nolan identify that ‘the current debate 
on the economic and social dimensions of transitional justice frequently suffers from 
terminological and conceptual confusion’ (Schmid and Nolan, 2014: 362). There is some risk 
of the transformative justice concept contributing to this confusion if applied inconsistently to 
numerous phenomena. Schmid and Nolan claim an authoritative interpretation of economic 
and social rights (ESR) (Schmid and Nolan, 2014: 365-367). Unfortunately, however, little is 
                                                          
20 These questions come to the forefront in reflection upon the range and content of papers presented at the 
Worldwide Universities Network’s (WUN’s) Transformative Justice Network conferences in 2011 and 2013 for 
instance (see WUN Transformative Justice Network, 2011; WUN Transformative Justice Network, 2013). 
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provided in terms of an argument supporting this position. Alternative understandings are 
merely posited as incorrect.21 Schmid and Nolan claim to provide ‘clarification’ to 
commentators whose views are not in line with their own and suggest that the implied failure 
of these commentators to understand the interaction between socioeconomic rights and 
transitional justice in their terms stems from the fact that many of these commentators are not 
lawyers (Schmid and Nolan, 2014: 371). Apparently unconcerned with the social 
construction of human rights or with the multiple different (including non-legal) 
interpretations, translations and applications of rights (see, for example, Stammers, 1999; 
Merry, 2006), Schmid and Nolan assert that transitional justice ‘has to engage with rights as 
they are – as legal standards – or, alternatively, use different vocabulary’ (Schmid and 
Nolan, 2014: 378; emphasis added). No convincing justification for this ‘legal positivism’ 
(see Stammers, 1999: 991-992) is provided.22 This chapter (and, implicitly, much of the book 
as a whole) argues that it is necessary to understand and approach human rights (and 
transitional justice) from a variety of (inter)disciplinary perspectives beyond the narrowly 
legal. 
 
Despite repeatedly claiming that a narrow conception of socioeconomic rights is the correct 
one, Schmid and Nolan allow for multiple and broad interpretations of transitional justice and 
                                                          
21 For instance, at various points alternative positions are described as ‘improper use and misunderstanding of 
ESR language and concepts’, ‘misuse and misunderstanding of ESR standards’, ‘misapplications’, ‘inaccurate’, 
‘problematic’ and as ‘an irritant to ESR advocates’. Schmid and Nolan’s claim that their ‘aim is not to denigrate 
the work’ of those they criticise does little to mitigate the fact that at times this appears to be what they do 
(Schmid and Nolan, 2014: 364-381). 
22 Evidence is provided to support the case that socioeconomic rights are legally protected, however (Schmid 
and Nolan, 2014: 365-367). 
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‘do not take a stance on whether or when legalist approaches to transitional justice are 
suitable’ (Schmid and Nolan, 2014: 380, 364). This apparent openness to multiple and broad 
definitions of transitional justice coupled with an intolerance of alternative understandings of 
socioeconomic rights does seem likely to add to the conceptual confusion Schmid and Nolan 
hope to address through attempting to ensure ‘participants in the debate on socioeconomic 
considerations in transitional justice have a way to assess whether they are talking about the 
same thing’ (Schmid and Nolan, 2014: 377).23 Moreover, in defining some ‘socioeconomic 
issues’ as broader than and separate to ‘rights’, Schmid and Nolan perform something of an 
intellectual sleight of hand (Schmid and Nolan, 2014: 363-364). Transitional justice is 
defined (broadly) in such a way as to easily include socioeconomic rights, making alternative 
notions such as transformative justice unnecessary (Schmid and Nolan, 2014: 380). 
Simultaneously, socioeconomic rights are defined (narrowly) in such a way as to exclude 
consideration of many of the issues which concern critics of mainstream transitional justice 
practice and advocates of alternatives such as transformative justice. This sidesteps key 
elements of the debate. For instance, Schmid and Nolan’s argument that ‘When armed forces 
burn houses, destroy crops, loot healthcare infrastructure or poison drinking water, these are 
violations of ESR that are neither structural nor relevant to the positive programmatic 
obligations imposed by those rights’ is persuasive (Schmid and Nolan, 2014: 373; see also 
Sharp, 2012). However, their emphasis on these sorts or socioeconomic rights issues obscures 
the question of how structural violence, inequalities and other socioeconomic ‘issues’ (not 
defined as rights by Schmid and Nolan) might be addressed in (post-)transitional contexts and 
whether transitional justice is the appropriate or best means to do so (Schmid and Nolan, 
                                                          




2014: 371-372). Many socioeconomic rights issues in post-transition South Africa – such as 
those surrounding access to land and housing, or education for that matter – are experienced 
structurally, rather than as a direct result of specific actions (see, for example, Gibson, 2011; 
Evans, 2016; Godsell, 2015). 
 
Also problematic in Schmid and Nolan’s account is the failure to distinguish between broad 
claims of transitional justice advocates and the lived reality of transitional justice in practice. 
It may very well be true that there is ‘no reason why a consideration of ESR within the 
context of attempts to redress a legacy of past abuses could not be accommodated within the 
scope of [a] mainstream definition of transitional justice’ (Schmid and Nolan, 2014: 380-
381). This says nothing about whether socioeconomic rights are frequently or successfully 
integrated into transitional justice in practice. Few would argue that socioeconomic rights 
issues were integral to transitional justice in South Africa (or indeed to the majority of 
transitional justice interventions).24 
 
Schmid and Nolan are critical of the suggestion made by some scholars that transitional 
justice processes typically focus on truth commissions, trials, amnesties and institutional 
reform, yet they nevertheless almost exclusively cite examples of these processes as means 
by which socioeconomic rights have been or might be integrated with transitional justice (see, 
for example, Schmid and Nolan, 2014: 369-370, 374, 376). Furthermore, discussion of the 
                                                          
24 See, for example, Gready (2011); Waldorf (2012); Robins (2013a); Gready and Robins (2014). 
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practical scope and limitations of these tools in addressing socioeconomic rights issues is 
almost entirely absent.25 
 
It is right to question the false dichotomy between socioeconomic rights and civil and 
political rights (Schmid and Nolan, 2014: 371-377). However, Schmid and Nolan’s proposals 
for incorporating socioeconomic rights into transitional justice in some ways highlight the 
need for transformative justice to be defined separately. Perhaps transitional justice cannot 
address the root causes of conflict or the broader socioeconomic issues Schmid and Nolan 
consider to be outside the remit of rights (Schmid and Nolan, 2014: 371-372; see also 
Waldorf, 2012). These still ought to be addressed. Transformative justice is one means by 
which a focus may be maintained on these issues and consideration may be given to tools and 
processes not typically associated with transitional justice. Transformative justice in this case 
is not merely doing transitional justice better; it is doing something different – though parallel 
– to transitional justice. 
 
The second difficulty, regarding the overt adoption of transformative justice as a framework 
for action, is now considered. Whilst from an advocacy point of view there may be benefits 
associated with explicitly adopting transformative justice as a framework for action it is not 
clear that this is likely to happen in South Africa.26 As it stands, explicit discussion of 
transformative justice (as opposed to the ideas which it links together) has largely come out 
                                                          
25 This is despite being discussed in the very work Schmid and Nolan criticise (see Evans, 2013a; Schmid and 
Nolan, 2014: 380). 
26 For discussion of challenges and possibilities associated with transformative justice as an explicit framework 
see Gready, 2014. 
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of academic discourse (see, for example, Gready, 2014). Moreover, in itself, taking up 
transformative justice as an overt framework may not be particularly worthwhile for civil 
society actors. Framing action compatibly with others and according to the appropriate 
advocacy venue may be more important (Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 18; Tarrow, 2005: 165). 
The payoff associated with analysis and evaluation of policy and practice according to a 
transformative justice perspective (however framed) is both more obvious and more 
immediate than the possible payoff associated with explicitly framing practice in terms of 
transformative justice. 
 
Recalling the above risk of imprecision, it is worth bearing in mind that changing the words 
describing action does not in itself change the nature of that action. It may be more use 
practically to facilitate the translation of the transformative justice concept into whatever 
vernacular form is meaningful and advantageous locally (see, Merry, 2006; Levitt and Merry, 
2009). This may include overt transformative justice framing but need not. The 
abovementioned South African discourse around social and political transformation might 
indicate a possible opening for mobilisation explicitly framed as transformative justice in this 
context. However, it may not – though this does not preclude the pursuit of the ideas of 
transformative justice under an alternative framing.27 
 
                                                          
27 It is possible, for instance, that the established (though vaguely defined) discourse around transformation 
might act as a hindrance to the overt adoption of transformative justice – a similar term with some possible 
overlap in meaning – as a framework for action in South Africa. 
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Indeed, there is a risk that the pursuit of transformative justice as an overt framework might 
come at the expense of more effective translation and advocacy ‘venue shopping’ (Merry, 
2006; Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 18). Civil society actors in South Africa engaging with issues 
which can be said to relate to transformative justice utilise a range of (sometimes 
overlapping) frames for action: human rights, development, anti-poverty, social justice and 
emancipatory politics, among others. Any of these framings may be equally or more effective 
than overt transformative justice framing under the right circumstances. Moreover, it is 
important for advocacy to take place in terms which are meaningful for and relevant to the 
affected communities participating. This is both to avoid the problems – such as 
disempowerment – associated with the top-down imposition of outsiders’ understandings and 
in order to maximise the chances of advocacy success.28 
 
Conclusion 
In answering the question this chapter set out to address – whether it is analytically and 
practically useful to consider the shortcomings of transitional justice processes, and the need 
to address contemporary socioeconomic injustices, in terms of a struggle for transformative 
justice – three main conclusions may be drawn. Regarding analytical use, it is concluded that 
there is a role for and value added by applying the concept of transformative justice. In 
particular, analysis from a transformative justice perspective can refocus attention upon the 
areas which are not addressed by transitional justice and can usefully link together some 
                                                          
28 See Robins, 2011; Robins, 2013a; Robins, 2013b; Merry, 2006; Levitt and Merry, 2009; Keck and Sikkink, 
1998: 18; Jordan and Van Tuijl, 2000; Tarrow, 2005: 165. 
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issues relating to contemporary social justice and development with historical wrongs – and 
analysis of how these might be addressed. 
 
Regarding practice, it is concluded that there is a strong case to be made for the utility of 
transformative justice in implicitly shaping practice regardless of how that practice is overtly 
framed. Analysis of contemporary socioeconomic rights issues in relation to whether they are 
rooted in historical injustice, and in terms of whether measures to address these sufficiently 
take account of this, allows practical contestation of policy and practice which maintains 
unjust conditions. Practice emerging from this analytical position can be said to follow the 
principles of transformative justice regardless of how it is explicitly framed. There is a 
weaker case, however, regarding the possibility of the overt adoption of transformative 
justice to frame policy and practice. Indeed, it may not always be beneficial for the pursuit of 
transformative justice to be explicitly framed as such. 
 
The more significant role for transformative justice, then, is in shaping understanding of, and 
agendas for, practice in terms of linking together ideas concerning structural violence and 
socioeconomic rights and in foregrounding the importance of addressing historical wrongs 
associated with these, including regarding the participation of those affected in these 
processes. This is important nonetheless. Shifting the focus of analysis of socioeconomic 
rights issues in order to take account of historical roots of injustices and opening up attempts 
to address historical wrongs to greater consideration of structural violence potentially adds 
value to both the understanding of contexts such as post-transition South Africa and to 
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